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ABSTRACT
Biophilia, theorized by Fromm, Wilson, and Kellert, is examined as 
a potential support for a pro-animal ethos. First, I look at the idea 
and its definitions at the hands of its chief theorizers. Then, I inves-
tigate how different stages of human cultural development (foraging, 
pastoralism, industrial agriculture) have influenced different aspects 
of biophilia—especially as this bears on animal alienation. Finally, 
I consider possible remedies in the form of renewed patterns of soli-
darity with other species, one of which transforms Marx’ concept of 
species-being. This article has ethical implications, but it is essen-
tially a work in philosophical anthropology.
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Animals offer [us] a companionship which is … offered to the 
loneliness of [the hu]man as a species. —John Berger 1980, 4
Most arguments on behalf of an animal-friendly ethos pro-
ceed by attempting to enlarge our sense of altruism. We are 
enjoined to expand the moral community to include such-and-
such other animals, sentient ones or sapient ones or some other 
delimitation. In this paper, I want to consider another argument 
to take other animals seriously, namely a prudential one of self-
interest on behalf of human development: it will be seen that 
we harbor a need for affinity with other life forms and that if 
this biophilic tendency is not met sufficiently, we risk stunting 
our own growth and fulfillment. This perspective is not meant 
to occlude or cancel out altruistic rationales, but is offered as a 
strong supplement to the standard sort of argumentation. It can 
serve as a potent motivator, if we can show that human flour-
ishing is partially dependent on positive association with other 
organisms. Now it turns out that biophilia is somewhat fragile, 
and can be overcome by certain forces of alienation spawned 
by our species’ cultural evolution from foraging, to pastoral-
ism, to industrial agriculture. Indeed, we are missing other life 
forms so much that an astrobiological fetish has arisen around 
the search for extra-terrestrial life—we yearn for discovery of 
and contact with alien organisms. I seek to remind us that we 
have already, on our own planet, a wonderful reservoir of lively 
diversity—we only need to build a renewed sense of solidar-
ity with the larger animal kingdom to reap biophilic benefits 
again. To accomplish this, however, it may be necessary to re-
define what Marx called our “species-being,” and I will suggest 
a promising way of doing just that.
But, first we have to start at the beginning and take stock of 
just what biophilia is. Although it is most often associated with 
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late-twentieth century writings of the natural scientist Edward 
O. Wilson and the social scientist Stephen Kellert, the term 
“biophilia” was actually first used in the mid-twentieth century 
by humanities researcher Erich Fromm. He says of biophilia 
that “its essence is love of life in contrast to love of death” and 
that “the most elementary form of this orientation is expressed 
in the tendency of all living organisms to live” (1964, 45). By 
this he has in mind botanical self-subsistence, zoological sur-
vival, and human self-preservation (1964, 45). Going into the 
matter more deeply, Fromm explains that “living substance has 
the tendency to integrate and to unite; it tends to fuse with dif-
ferent and opposite entities, and to grow in a structural way”—
this unification and integrated growth are characteristic of 
what he calls the “biophilous orientation” in both its biological 
and psychological manifestations (1964, 45f.). He goes on to 
say that “the full unfolding of biophilia is to be found in the 
productive orientation. The person who fully loves life is at-
tracted by the process of life and growth in all spheres. … He 
enjoys life and all its manifestations” (1964, 46f.). Distinct from 
my interest in biophilia as a bridge between species, Fromm is 
most interested in it’s role as a kind of humanism: “Love of 
life underlies the various versions of humanistic philosophy” 
(1964, 48).
Fromm aligns biophilia with mental health (see Fromm 1964, 
114, where he diagrams it into the “syndrome of growth” as op-
posed to the “syndrome of decay”), and thinks it is so signifi-
cant that it is worth detailing its preconditions.Ontogenetically, 
“the most important condition for the development of love of 
life in the child is for him to be with people who love life” 
(1964, 51). Subsidiary conditions include: “warm, affectionate 
contact with others during infancy; freedom, and absence of 
threats; teaching … of the principles conducive to inner har-
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mony and strength; guidance in the ‘art of living’; stimulating 
influence of and response to others; a way of life that is genu-
inely interesting” (51). Socially, the conditions for biophilia’s 
development are abundance rather than scarcity, abolition of 
injustice, and cultivation of (especially positive) freedom (52). 
“Summing up,” Fromm indicates that “love for life will develop 
most in a society where there is: security in the sense that the 
basic material conditions for a dignified life are not threatened, 
justice in the sense that nobody can be an end [or a means] for 
the purposes of another, and freedom in the sense that each [hu]
man has the possibility to be an active and responsible member 
of society” (1964, 52f., italics original).
Two decades later E. O. Wilson appropriated the term bio-
philia and redefined it with a special, centrifugal emphasis: he 
introduces it as “the innate tendency to focus on life and life-
like processes” and later refers to it as “the urge to affiliate with 
other forms of life” (1984, 1, 85). Significantly, Wilson’s us-
age turns from Fromm’s anthropocentrism to a more biocentric 
notion: “Humanity is exalted not because we are so far above 
other living creatures, but because knowing them well elevates 
the very concept of life” (1984, 22).
This germ of an idea, planted by Wilson, was cultivated by 
others in the decades surrounding the turn of the millennium. 
Chief among these is Stephen Kellert, who claims that “the 
biophilia notion … powerfully asserts that much of the human 
search for a coherent and fulfilling existence is intimately de-
pendent upon our relationship to nature” (2013, 43). Indeed, 
Kellert places the concept near to the formation of identity: 
“The effective expression of the biophilia need may consti-
tute an important basis for a meaningful experience of self.” 
(60) The phenomenon is expressed through nine dimensions 
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of biophilic value: utilitarian, having to do with human sus-
tenance, protection, and security; naturalistic, dealing with 
fascination, wonder, and awe at natural diversity (this includes 
curiosity, exploration, and an interest in outdoor fitness); ecolo-
gistic, involving precise study and systematic inquiry into na-
ture and life (including observation and analysis); aesthetic, 
having reference to a positive impression of beauty in nature/
life (as greater than artifice, displaying harmony, symmetry, 
and order); symbolic, having to do with means of facilitating 
communication and thought (providing a metaphor bank and 
an impetus to classify); humanistic, dealing with deep emo-
tional attachment to individual anthropomorphs (revealed in 
care and nurturance, bonded altruism); moralistic, involving 
ethical responsibility and reverence for the natural world of life 
(including protection and conservation); dominionistic, having 
reference to a will to master nature and other life; negativistic, 
having to do with fear, aversion, antipathy to perceived threats 
or danger (including harm and cruelty) (2013, 45-56). I am 
leery of these last two categories. About them Kellert states 
that “even the tendency to avoid, reject, and, at times destroy 
elements of the natural world can be viewed as an extension 
of an innate need to relate deeply and intimately with the vast 
spectrum of life about us” (2013, 42). I am tempted, rather, to 
revert to Fromm here and to view such expressions as tied to 
what he called necrophilia (attraction to death and destruction) 
and thus not a part of biophilia (affirmatively understood).
Now one salient dimension of biophilia includes its moral 
upshot, and it is important to remember the roots of this aspect. 
Kellert puts it, “an ethical responsibility for conserving nature 
[and life within it] stems from more than altruistic sympathy 
and compassionate concern: it is driven by a profound sense 
of self-interest and biological imperative” (because biophilia 
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is innate and necessary for thriving). (2013, 60) Other theo-
rists also give testimony along these same lines. For instance, 
Martha Nussbaum, in explicating her capabilities approach to 
justice, catalogs the capabilities central to human dignity and 
flourishing—she includes reference to “other species. Being 
able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature” (2011, 34, italics original). Likewise, 
Fromm states that “biophilic ethics have their own principle 
of good and evil. Good is reverence for life, all that enhances 
life, growth, unfolding” (here the reference to “reverence for 
life” is explicitly made with Albert Schweitzer in mind, see 
n. 9). (1964, 47) He elaborates the character-type associated 
with morality in this vein: “The biophilous conscience is moti-
vated by its attraction to life and joy; the moral effort consists 
in strengthening the life-loving side in oneself” (1964, 47).
Just as biophilia can be seen as a ground of animal ethics, 
synergistic fashion animal ethics can be viewed as an inflec-
tion upon biophilia. Here it is helpful to notice that biophilia 
requires “environmental triggers” for full expression, and that 
it varies by culture and by individual in accordance with spe-
cific regimes of cultivation (Wilson and Kellert 2013, 230). One 
mode of cultivation could be ethical, and that would bring into 
relief the particularly moral facets of the various dimensions 
of biophilia. The utilitarian dimension, for instance, would be 
constrained by non-maleficence toward other organisms. The 
naturalistic expression would enhance reverence for all life. 
The ecologistic side would deepen our sense of caring along the 
lines of the insight that we care about that which we know. The 
aesthetic dimension would breed a greater understanding of the 
intertwinement of beauty and goodness as it relates to biodi-
versity. An appreciation for our repository of animal memes 
would accompany the symbolic expression. Additionally, the 
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humanistic side would aid in respectful guardianship of animal 
companions. Finally, the dominionistic and negativistic dimen-
sions would be assuaged by an animal-friendly ethos.
As has been intimated already, biophilia is not a strongly in-
nate tendency—it is not a determinant that will establish itself 
under any and all conditions. In particular, our cultural evolu-
tion as a species has had definite influences upon its expres-
sion. The general thought here is that a heightened sense of 
alienation from biodiversity and nature has accompanied our 
moves from foraging to pastoralism to agriculture (including 
its industrialized form currently regnant). This point can be 
overdrawn, as when we imagine some blissfully harmonious 
biophilia among Pleistocene hunters and see only alienation 
among high-tech moderns. The actual story is quite a bit more 
nuanced and complex, with different dimensions of biophilia 
being played up or down at different phases of cultural evolu-
tion. Let us survey some of these differences of emphasis in the 
broad history of our species.
Historian Richard Bulliet serves as a useful source for such 
a survey, for he identifies several stages in human-animal re-
lations that map onto the development of human culture. (In 
addition to Bulliet’s anthropological analysis, a full-scale treat-
ment—beyond the scope of the present article—would require 
an economic examination that includes capitalism’s effects.) 
First, there is a process of separation by which humans come to 
recognize themselves as a distinct species among others (2005, 
40f.). This development does not spell a diminution in biophil-
ia; in fact, it may constitute a necessary precondition for grow-
ing an affinity for other organisms insofar as one first has to 
recognize the difference between self and others to feel a link-
age between them. The second step is the stage of pre-domes-
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tic culture that foragers inhabit, whereby “human groups went 
beyond their initial species consciousness and began to think 
of animals as objects for artwork, storytelling , and religious 
reverence” (2005, 41). Biophilia sees an uptick at this point, 
especially in the aesthetic, symbolic, and naturalistic dimen-
sions. Next, there is the domestic stage that pastoralists and 
farmers inhabit; at this point animals become more useful to 
humans, but their spiritual qualities diminish (2005, 42). There 
is a rise in the utilitarian expression of biophilia and dominion-
istic tendencies are accented. Finally, there is the post-domestic 
stage at which industrializing humans and animals no longer 
live together (excepting pets). (2005, 42) Here much biophilia 
wanes and alienation from biodiversity rises due to migra-
tion to cities, replacement of draft animals, mechanization of 
farms, and destruction of forest and wilderness (Katcher and 
Wilkins 2013, 191).Let us take a second pass at cultural evolu-
tion, this time emphasizing the role played by humans vis-à-vis 
other animals. The oldest pattern is that of foraging and hunt-
ing. Gathering activities accent the utilitarian, naturalistic, and 
ecologistic dimensions of biophilia. In order to make use of 
various plants and the kills of other species the gatherer must 
be stoked in curiosity and fully explore the terrain, being care-
ful to discriminate (and thus classify) salutary from harmful or 
otherwise non-beneficial types of vegetal and zoologic suste-
nance. Hunting presents an interesting profile. There is a rich 
venatic tradition that stresses the solidarity hunters feel with 
their prey, sometimes characterizing the kill in spiritual and 
quasi-religious terms. A central feature of this account is the 
claim that the human predator performs certain rituals respect-
fully and gains permission from the prey species for killing 
and ingestion. I have a different take on this sort of behavior—I 
see it as alienating, inasmuch as it is a self-delusion that masks 
the reality of the prey’s desire to live. To pretend your intended 
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prey wants predation to succeed is to put oneself, profoundly, 
at a distance from the actual will to survive and thrive that 
characterizes all animal life. Thus, on my view at least, hunter-
gatherers display a rather mixed picture of biophilia and alien-
ation.
Next comes the phase when humans act as pastoralists in 
relation to other animals. Herders emphasize the utilitarian and 
humanistic dimensions of biophilia. When you closely look af-
ter the care of animals used for various products, there is a 
tendency to anthropomorphize them as your (often childlike) 
charges. Note that this is also true for more sedentary farm-
ers who raise livestock in close proximity to their own living 
quarters. Despite the intimacy of relations at this stage, there is 
also a strong admixture of alienation from the actual animals 
involved inasmuch as the herded or farmed animal, though 
dependent, does not remain juvenile but rather grows into its 
own integrity as an adult member of its species. The herder/
farmer misses something of the animal’s reality when s/he is 
neotenized in an anthropomorphic way. Once again, we see the 
operation of illusions in the human-animal interface. It would 
seem that the condition of heterotrophy prompts these delu-
sions, because humans have found it difficult to acknowledge 
the situation as such or as naturalistic tragedy rather than do-
mesticating the experience as one of willing sacrifice or dumb 
dependency.
The latest phase is that of industrialized agriculture: in mov-
ing from family farms to factory farms an emphasis on the 
utilitarian dimension of biophilia is retained and a stress on 
dominonism is added. Whereas the family farmer (or herder) 
could still relate to his animals in the capacity of caretaker or 
guardian, the factory farmer becomes much more like a master 
Ralph Acampora
145
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
machinist of the abstract processes of livestock preparation and 
disassembly. The sheer density and mass of animals involved 
ensures this result of greater alienation, whereby persons in 
charge of processing must needs operate as master techni-
cians on organisms that have been transmogrified into ersatz 
machines. The industrial scale of operations smothers any re-
sidual intimacy at the human-animal interface. Likewise, con-
sumers of the animal products thus made are distanced from 
the animal realities of the products’ sources: distanced physi-
cally in the separation of facilities from scenes of everyday life, 
and distanced cognitively in the creation of absent referents in 
the language used to talk about animal products (e.g., “steak” 
instead of “flesh”, “beef” instead of “cow”, etc.). Thus, we are 
confronted with a net gain in alienation.
One salient way this alienation registers is in the wide-
spread, deep-going cultural phenomenon of searching for ex-
tra-terrestrial life. It is as if we are cut off from earthly life to 
the extent that we hinge our prospects of discovering signifi-
cant otherness onto other planets. One NASA scientist avers 
“the public and the media respond more to stories about alien 
life than to anything else we do” (Grinspoon 2003, xvi). Like-
wise, an historian of science finds that “the question of extra-
terrestrial life remains the most emotionally and ideologically 
charged issue associated with astronomy” (Crowe 1999, 557). 
To be sure, this concern of ours is seen to have ancient roots: 
the NASA scientist thinks that “the [alien] question goes way 
back. We’ve been wondering, speculating, fretting, hallucinat-
ing, and prognosticating about aliens about as long as anyone 
can remember. … [For a very long time] we’ve had the capacity 
and the inclination to wonder whether there were others like us” 
(Grinspoon 2003, 6). A noted science fiction writer opines that 
“humankind’s ancient fascination with aliens is built into our 
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genes. There’s evolution at work here. Meeting aliens has been 
a normal thing for humankind. … We have dealt with alien 
intelligences for all of the time that humans have had brains” 
(Niven 1987, 4). My view is that this native impulse reaches 
new heights and attains the status of fetish (only) when we have 
undergone great alienation from the wide, wild biodiversity of 
other species here on Earth. We feel cosmic loneliness to the 
point of desperation (only) when we feel alone at home. As one 
thinker puts it, “one has the impression of being alone in an 
impersonal universe devoid of any foundational and ultimate 
solicitude and providential intimacy/meaning”; the world ap-
pears unfriendly and hostile and the subject feels absurdity and 
forlornness (McGraw 1995, 60).
Interestingly, we needn’t pore over evidence of possible life 
from outer space—no, not when we have yet to explore all the 
weird and wild organisms that actually populate our own plan-
et.
Precisely at the moment when we have overcome the 
earth and become unearthly in our modes of dwell-
ing, [one commentator opines,] we need to restore our 
kinship with the animate world. We suffer these days 
from a new form of collective anxiety: species loneli-
ness [recall this article’s epigraph by John Berger]. … 
Modern humanity yearns to reestablish and restore an 
ecology of shared identity. (Toomey 2013)
Indeed, here is where Hegel himself makes a famously feline 
grin (a la Chesire): the “[hu]man must define [it]self by what [it] 
is not”. The idea, then, is that “an individual can define a human 
identity by means of a relationship outside those [s/]he has with 
[her/]his own group”. (Slusser and Rabkin 1987, xix and xv) 
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How are such (inter)relationships to be composed? Ecologist 
Michael Soule enters the scene with advice that is generalized 
but less abstract—he seeks to teach us that the womb of biophi-
lism is bioregional communities with their tribal-pagan-forager 
wisdom plus related science/technology and sustainable land 
use (Wilson and Kellert 2013, 454).If the insights formulated 
above make sense, then “the effective expression of the bio-
philia need may constitute an important basis for meaningful 
experience of self” (Wilson and Kellert 2013, 60). In addition, 
the biophilia concept “calls for a common ethic of the conser-
vation of nature” (Simalka and Samways, 905). (This happens 
when the implicit vitality of the whole biosphere and its myriad 
constituents get viewed through the lens of animism, some-
thing anathema to purely scientific theorists yet celebratory to 
those with a more capacious understanding of nature and life.) 
Underscoring a point I hinted at earlier, Kellert claims that “an 
ethical responsibility for conserving nature stems from more 
than altruistic sympathy and compassionate concern: it is driv-
en by a profound sense of self-interest and biological impera-
tive” (Wilson and Kellert 2013, 60).
Before we move forward with biophilia, let’s review the 
kinds of estrangement that have worked themselves into our 
experience of natural environs and the denizens that dwell 
therein. There are limiting factors, such as loss of biodiversity, 
extinction of hands-on/visceral contact, demise of oral stories 
(including plant and animal characters). This situation breeds 
disaffection, apathy, and irresponsibility toward nature (The 
Biophilia Hypothesis 2013, 233 and 239). Following Berger, 
first-world alienation from other animals is due to (human) mi-
gration to cities, replacement of draft animals, mechanization 
of farms, and destruction of forest and wilderness (Katcher and 
Wilkins 2013, 191). One famous psychologist unsurprisingly 
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mentions more psychic phenomena: “Human self-awareness 
has made [the hu]man a stranger in the [natural] world, sepa-
rate, lonely, and frightened” (Fromm, in Mathehu’s Weblog ).
Assuming the condition of alienation is not salutary, how 
might we keep it at bay? In other words, how might we cul-
tivate solidarity with the living world surrounding us? More 
than one commentator cites the overhaul of elementary educa-
tion and indeed of childhood itself. Suppose every schoolchild 
chose a creature to study and report on repeatedly throughout 
elementary school--: “The capacity for bioaffiliation in the ris-
ing generation would be boundless.” (McVay 2013, 11) Short 
of that tactic, we could admit that “creating kinship with ani-
mals … made the world a more comfortable place by reducing 
human isolation”; we could then seek to reincorporate direct 
sensory experience into science education—“the ability of liv-
ing things to hold children’s attention should be used to help 
them learn how to understand the living environment, respect 
the appearance of the world, and take responsibility for its 
care” (Katcher and Wilkins 2013, 187 and 192). Boons for bio-
philia include bioregional practice and eco-education on a lo-
cal level(Orr 2013, 433). An eminent eco-philosopher, Holmes 
Rolston III, encourages a move beyond education as schooling: 
“Biological identity … mingles with biological solidarity and 
is shared with the fauna and flora of the eco-systemic whole.” 
(The Biophilia Hypothesis 2013, 407) This probably makes 
for a more viable cross-species solidarity, if the alternative is 
Charles Foster’s Being a Beast: Adventures Across the Species 
Divide (Metropolitan Books, 2017). Therein, Foster records 
his various attempts at actually living other animals’ niches—
sleeping in the outdoors (sans tent), eating worms, going about 
naked, foraging, etc. While this strategy sounds exciting and 
challenging, it would be well for us to remember that what bio-
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philes are after is communion through difference and not fu-
sion through sameness.
Relatedly, we should examine the preconditions for, as well 
as the consequences of, biophilia’s growth. William Manson 
announces, “Joyful alive-ness is renewed when one feels exu-
berantly free from societal constraints and yet intimately con-
nected with the world of living nature.” (2003, 360) This outlook 
is like Wilson’s or Kellert’s views, only on steroids or Ecstasy. 
A contrary approach is outlined by a Fromm enthusiast: “For 
biophilia to emerge or be sustained, certain societal conditions 
need to be in place. Chief among them are the absence of in-
justice and the presence of freedom to create and innovate.” 
(Mathehu Weblog, 2010) Likewise, we can hear from another 
commentator the influence of Frankfurt-School reasoning: 
“For Fromm biophilia is the essence of humanitarian ethics. … 
He believes that a productive, creative, caring attitude toward 
life is crucial … to fighting any form of alienation” (Eckhardt 
1992, 233-40, italics added). On this viewpoint reverence for 
life takes precedence over some/many ecologists’ penchant for 
hunting (e.g. Aldo Leopold)—take a look, for instance, at a 
recent album published by NYT: there are several photographs 
testifying to human-squirrel cohabitation (the squirrels’ nest 
hangs on a fire-escape outside the humans’ apartment) and a 
few paragraphs about it (Sterchi and Howard 2017, 7).
So, again now—how can/does solidarity arise and grow 
between different species? We have seen hints of it along the 
course of the article. Let’s focus on it here, and see if we can’t 
come to understand and appreciate some views on the precise 
issue at hand. The first author to consider, David Abram, wrote 
the wonderful Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology. His 
position in the book is to reawaken our senses and mentality to 
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their organismic roots in the natural environment. This is the 
core of “owning up to being an animal, a creature of the earth”. 
Such a project calls on us to “grow a worthy cosmology by at-
tending closely to our encounters with other creatures”. If we 
bring ourselves “in service to the more-than-human matrix of 
corporeal encounter”, we will reap essential “contact and inter-
change with other shapes of life” (2010, 3 and 7). Abram goes 
all the way with his animism, which is to say he sees not only 
animals (definitely) but also plants (maybe), rocks (unlikely) as 
animate, conscious fellows (the parentheticals are mine). The 
world for Abram is oceanic, with no part of it completely inani-
mate: “There’s an affinity between my body and the sensible 
presences that surround me, an old solidarity that pays scant 
heed to our overeducated distinction between animate and in-
animate matter.” (2010, 29, italics added)
At this point, many/most readers will balk and want to get 
off the biosophic tour he offers. Yet Abram is aware of poten-
tial criticisms, and he supplies responses to them: 
Our animal senses, co-evolved with the animate land-
scape, are still tuned to the many- voiced earth. Our 
creaturely body, shaped in ongoing interaction with 
the other bodies that compose the biosphere, remains 
poised and thirsting for contact with otherness. (2010, 
264)
How is our thirst slaked? By experiences with wild yet re-
lated others.
The simple act of perception is experienced as an in-
terchange between oneself and that which one per-
ceives—as a meeting, a participation, a communion of 
beings. For each thing that we sense is assumed to be 
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sensitive in its own right, able to feel and respond to 
the beings around it, and to us. (2010, 268)
Another connection Abram affirms, yet only briefly hints at, 
is the world of hunting and omnivory therefrom. Paul Shepard 
is a towering influence on Abram, and the reader suspects that 
the former encouraged the latter to accept a degree of atavism 
into his cosmology. Not for Shepard (nor Abram) welfarism, 
vegetarianism, domestication (= slavery). (Shepard 2013, 279 
and 282) “The Pleistocene offers us no compassion for animals 
in the warm idiom of the teddy bear,” declares Shepard. Well-
meaning animal lovers are sentimentally infected with the 
Noah Syndrome (we are rescuers) and the Peaceable Kingdom 
Myth (we are gentle at the interface between species). (Shepard 
2013, 275ff. and 288) To these complaints, I would respond that 
atavism is not always the best exemplar for contemporary be-
havior, that the Anthropocene provides occasions for empathy 
with other animals’ predicaments (not necessarily pity, which I 
agree has a connotation of hierarchy to be resisted). 
So what are we to do? Shepard says we should love ani-
mals as sacred beings and respect them collectively as other 
peoples (Shepard 2013, 289). The other-nations frame comes 
from Henry Beston, in his The Outermost House, and has re-
cently been supported by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka in 
their Zoöpolis. It overplays the struggle to survive as compe-
tition, and underestimates the great amount of symbiosis and 
collaboration extant in trans-species encounters. Now love-talk 
presents a conundrum, in terms of ingestion ethics—is it per-
missible that we eat those whom we love? Many pro-hunting 
advocates have previously answered “yes”, on the basis that 
hunters get to know their prey and its territory better. A re-
cent entry into this debate, Dominique Lestel’s Eat This Book: 
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A Carnivore’s Manifesto (see especially the first and second 
“courses” [= chapters], “Some [Good] Reasons Not to Become 
an Ethical Vegetarian” [21-56], “The Ethics of the Carnivore” 
[57-80] (trans. by G. Steiner, 2016), contributes another positive 
factor—namely, that organic omnivores get to truly participate 
in the chemical and emotional experience that is heterotrophy. 
My feeling and thinking about such apologetics has evolved 
into the negative, which is to say that I tend to side more with 
the veg(etari)ans. I think that photo-hunters can pick up much 
the same knowledge as subsistence or cultural hunters do (ex-
cepting, of course, the skills of butchery). Further, I feel that 
heterotrophy can be experienced in the botanical register and 
does not necessarily depend on zootic practice. (Here I should 
give some notice of plants: killing and eating them can be con-
sidered a form of self-defense in that giving up ingestion of 
plants would reduce veg[etari]ans’ heterotrophy to [at least 
near] zero and so results in death [of the would-be predator]. 
If this point is insufficient for the reader, consider that many if 
not most animals are generally given to self-consciousness [or 
at least higher sapience] while plants are not, a condition which 
conventionally raises the former’s moral status above the lat-
ter’s.) At this point we can take into account cannibalism, for I 
rather doubt that most (or even many) pro-hunters are prepared 
to pursue their ecological and biological desiderata into the hu-
man race. If that last claim is true, hunting would be exposed 
as a speciesist practice. Thus I conclude that loving does not 
imply eating everything.
There is one last issue for us to discuss (as listed in my in-
troductory words above): how does/n’t the concept of species-
being apply to humanity? Species-being is a Marxian notion 
meant to designate both the essence of the type “human” and 
the self-awareness of this essence by human beings. In other 
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words, species-being is Marx’s way of thinking through human 
nature as a conscious animal. Being anthropocentric himself, 
Marx insists that only humans are free and self-conscious enti-
ties—and so only humans have proper access to (their own) 
species-being (Wartenberg 1982, 77-95; some contest Marx’s 
anthropocentrism, e.g. Bellamy Foster and Burkett 2017). 
Before ending our discussion, I want to take issue with two 
parts of this conceptual (mis)construction. First, there may be 
a significant number of non-humans who have species-being 
(elephants, cetaceans, other great apes, etc.). If that is true, 
then we already have access to alien, peer intelligences beyond 
the human (and so the astrobiological fetish is somewhat pre-
mature). Second, if species-being is allowed to define social 
identity, scholars and students of animality will miss curious 
features of different creatures. For instance, the social con-
struction of grouping--what counts as a “we” when we say or 
write “we”--can be unnecessarily narrow, as when we notice 
species characteristics but remain relatively unconcerned with 
other taxonomic constitutions (say, genus, family, order, phy-
lum, kingdom, etc.). A couple years ago, a theorist contribut-
ing to the NYT selected and defended mammal as the most 
appropriate and promising dimension of bio-affiliation: “my 
feeling of solidarity for mammals strengthens my feelings of 
pity and pride regarding that particular branch of the mam-
mal family known as homo.” To think of ourselves as primar-
ily homosapiens is to continue the long and nasty tradition of 
human exceptionalism. “We are in need of new perceptions of 
self, ones that acknowledge our close relationship to the rest 
of life on Earth. Thinking of ourselves not as human, but as 
mammals, provides an accessible path to a greater awareness 
of what we have in common with other species” (Laist 2015). 
(An example would be comparing human species-being to hu-
man class-being [i.e. mammal].) The mammal affiliation is not 
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too narrow (human, race, sex, creed, economic class, etc. often 
lead to vicious chauvinisms); neither is it too broad (organism 
or earthling may make for an identification that’s too thin, not 
substantive enough). Finally, then, biophilic solidarity might 
benefit us (as humans) and undermine anthropocentrism if it is 
moderate in affiliating with a class of animals (i.e. mammals).
The issue of identification just discussed gives us a picture 
of the cross-species ontology human animals might invoke as 
they try to re-build their sense of self and relevant biological 
alliances. Multi-species identity metaphysics (MIM) you may 
call it, and it sets the stage of solidarity for inter-species philos-
ophy and advocacy. In other words, we’ve got a fix on a mind-
set that may prove powerful enough to dislodge present animal 
alienation and become especially fruitful for future human-an-
imal interaction and relationship. MIM can serve as a platform 
for a new kind of zoopolitics, something a lot like Donaldson’s 
and Kymlicka’s rendition. If we ask the question, what should 
inter-species society look like?, certain demographic images/
metaphors suggest themselves, the most obvious being the no-
torious melting pot of assimilation—here we might say that 
pet-keeping illustrates the metaphor. The melting pot is cur-
rently in disfavor, because it seems to demand too much—i.e., 
the sacrifice of original culture or niche. We could then move 
forward with a different image, namely that of the salad, the 
figurative tossing of which provides a place for the mixture of 
cultures/niches. But there are drawbacks to this vision: on or 
by whose interests will the salad be tossed?, if participants can 
keep their previous culture or niche, what would be the com-
mingling element—just a dressing seems too superficial. We 
are brought by these reflections to a third option, one I prefer: 
the stew, in which all ingredients retain the basics of their pre-
vious forms (sufficient for identification), but also one in which 
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all ingredients contribute their distinctive flavors to the com-
mon stock or broth that permeates other ingredients such that 
they take on some of the tastes associated with those others.
I would like now at least to mention other possibilities to 
the first two positions sketched above and arrive at instantia-
tion of the option I prefer. I suggested pet-keeping might be an 
exemplar of assimilative relations (especially when the pet is 
expected to play the role of a junior family member). An alter-
native can be seen in Donna Haraway’s The Companion Spe-
cies Manifesto, where she grants difference/otherness its due 
rather than relying solely on similitude. Secondly, the tossed 
salad metaphor can be illustrated by the institution of zoos, 
where the ingredients/inhabitants still have some differences 
but they are collectivized through captivity; alternatives are 
described in Ralph Acampora’s Metamorphoses of the Zoo. 
The third and last option was that of the stew, which may be 
visited in the imagination by examining Henry Beston’s The 
Outermost House and Jennifer Wolch’s “Zoopolis” in Capital-
ism, Nature, Socialism. These authors allow wild animals their 
species-specific umwelt (eco-worlds). Moves in this direction 
can help clear some space for the revitalization of biophilia, 
thus overcoming various aspects of animal alienation. It may 
seem strange to argue for solidarity between the species when 
I amongothers also argue for leaving them alone—the key is 
that these two approaches have to be brought into an equilib-
rium that avoids too much intimacy and yet does not result in 
species apartheid.
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